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# **Services in Free Trade Agreements**

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## **1. Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to review the treatment of services in a sample of Free Trade agreements. Some of the questions motivating this review are

- the extent to which the agreements have a common structure and content, which will facilitate their amalgamation and the extension of their conditions to current non-members
- the extent to which the agreements go beyond the commitments made by their members in the GATS
- the likelihood that preferential agreements of the type studied here will have a significant effect on regional services trade.

There are in addition a number of other questions of interest with respect to the specific provisions of the agreements. The agreements examined are listed in Table 1.

Information is collated on the content of each agreement and transformed into scores,

according to the procedures outlined Tables A1-A3. A lower score is applied to an arrangement which is regarded as less liberal, and a higher score is applied to more liberal arrangements. Scores range between zero and one. Tables A1-A3 contain the full set of scores organised by modes of supply for the various elements of the agreements, under sub-headings of the form and content of the agreement. Because the scoring was also undertaken for about 80 regional agreements officially permitted by WTO, some notable findings obtained from the larger sample will also be reported in this paper.

The following sections summarise some of the main conclusions with respect to form and content, the treatment of market access provisions compared to national treatment, the implications of larger membership and the treatment of rules of origin. The final section summarises the main points where we argue that while these agreements include some treatment of services, the ‘devil is in the detail’ of their provisions.

**Table 1: FTAs included in this study**

AFTA	EU-Mexico
AFTA-China	Japan-Mexico
Australia-US	Japan-Singapore
CER	Korea-Singapore
Chile-Korea	NAFTA
EFTA	US-Singapore

**Table 2: Type of agreement by the region of the members**

**(a) National Treatment: Mode 1 and 2**

Region*	Asia	Europe	Americas	Northern America	Africa	Oceania
<i>Negative-List Agreement</i>						
Asia						
Europe		4				
Americas	1	1	9			
Northern America	2	1	3	1		
Africa						
Oceania	1			1		1
<i>Positive-List Agreement</i>						
Asia	3					
Europe	2		1	1		
Americas			1			
Northern America	1					
Africa		3			1	
Oceania	2					

\*: Based on UN regional classification.

**(b) Market Access: Mode 1 and 2**

	Asia	Europe	Americas	Northern America	Africa	Oceania
<i>Negative-List Agreement</i>						
Asia						
Europe						
Americas	1	1	7			
Northern America	1	1	2	1		
Africa						
Oceania	1			1		1
<i>Positive-List Agreement</i>						
Asia	5					
Europe	2					
Americas		1	1			
Northern America	1	1	1			
Africa		3			1	
Oceania	2					

## 2. Form and Content

### 2-1. Regional characteristics of form

The form of the agreement adopted in regional agreements varies significantly across the regions. Table 2, which refers to a larger sample of agreements, classifies the form of the sample agreements based on the region of the member countries. For example,

the Japan-Singapore agreement is included in the Asia-Asia regional combination (agreement). Evidently, the agreements where an Asian economy is involved generally more often take a GATS-like format, namely positive-binding (bottom-up) list for national treatment and market access. On the other hand, the agreements ratified in North American region and Western Hemisphere are mostly based on the NAFTA template, that is, a negative-list binding (top-down).


Table 2 also reveals that European countries, in general, tend to select different strategies depending on the partner region. For instance, these countries are inclined to choose a negative-list approach for national treatment in the agreements with other European countries and with countries in the Americas and Northern America, but adopt the positive-list approach in the agreements with Asia and Africa. Because the latter regions are more likely to take a negative stance for liberalization in services, and a large number of sectoral reservations are often listed, a positive-list format is likely to be preferred in the agreements involving these regions. However, strategy within European agreements appears to have changed for market access, since the positive-list binding has become the mainstream approach for market access policy in most agreements, regardless of the partner region.

The choice of form of binding varies among Asian countries. Whereas the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) follows the GATS-style, services agreements involving Korea, such as Korea-Chile and Korea-Singapore, take the NAFTA-like form (see Figure 1 and Table A-4 at the end of the paper). Japan takes different approaches case by case. In the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership

Agreement, Japan adopted the GATS-like agreement, which is contrary to the approach that Korea took in the agreement with Singapore. Meanwhile, in the free trade agreement with Mexico, Japan followed NAFTA-like negative-list approach.

Figure 1, which compares the degree of liberalization of the agreements based on the simple averages of the scorings, reveals that, regarding mode 3 and 4, there are no outstanding agreements in terms of liberalization in trade in services. The scores on mode 1 and 2 have relatively larger variations among agreements. Generally, the Australia-US agreement and CER could be regarded as more liberal than other agreements.


**Figure 1: The simple averages of scores**



Note:

1. AFTA-China is still under negotiation.
2. No commitment for market access in EFTA and Japan-Mexico.

Figure 1 (Cont): The simple averages of scores



In addition, the difference in form does not always indicate the degree of liberalization. For example, regarding mode 1 and 2, the scoring results show that the form of the Japan-Singapore agreement is no less liberal compared to the Japan-Mexico agreement (Figure 1). The former follows the GATS-template, while the latter does not necessarily cover the liberalizing measures stipulated in GATS, e.g. market access and domestic regulations (see Table A-4).

With regard to air transport services, most agreements have not included more far-reaching commitments than the existing GATS and NAFTA treatment. Namely, the agreements do not apply to measures affecting traffic rights including the services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights. EU-Mexico and NAFTA explicitly exclude the commitments to liberalization on air transport services. Therefore most regional agreements have not embarked on making a regional framework to liberalize air transport.

## **2-2. Negative-list vs. Positive-list approach - contents**

More generally, it seems that whether an agreement follows a negative-list approach or positive-list approach does not always indicate the extent of liberalization, as is sometimes argued. The comparison of the form of agreement in Figure 1 shows that the agreements based on a negative-list approach are not always more liberal than those following the positive-list style for mode 1 and 2. However, a more critical factor characterizing the effectiveness of liberalization measures for trade in services is the ‘presentation and contents’ of the list, especially sectoral reservations, rather than its format.



The system of sectoral classification of services is important. A positive-binding style lists all the sectors opened for the suppliers in other member countries on the basis of Central Product Classification (CPC) as in GATS. Restrictions are frequently attached even if a sector is contained in the liberalizing list. Meanwhile, a negative-binding format indicates the reserved sectors, but it is sometimes based on each country's own sectoral classification (Japan, Mexico, US, Canada etc.). Although concordance tables between these different classifications are available, comparisons might be misleading because there are several cases in which each country's own classification is applied only to some sensitive sectors such as business services while others are classified by the CPC system. Bearing in mind these qualifications, this study continues to compare agreements according to the concordance tables<sup>1</sup>.

Table 3 reveals that a great number of agreements include sectoral exclusions in their specific commitments. The agreements involving Australia such as CER and Australia-US agreement generally provide a smaller number of sectoral reservations, whereas many agreements involving developing countries such as AFTA more likely contain many sectoral restrictions. In general, a larger number of sectoral reservations and severe restrictions are attached to the sensitive sectors such as financial services, communication services and transport services, while tourism and travel services and construction services are likely to have a smaller number of reservations.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic\\_manual.html](http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html),  
<http://www.stat.go.jp/index/seido/sangyo/>

**Table 3: Percentages of Sectoral Exclusions**

<b>Agreements</b>	<b>% excluded</b>
CER	8.0
Australia-US	23.6
NAFTA	37.2
EFTA	44.7
Chile-Korea	46.4
Japan-Singapore	46.7
Japan-Mexico	53.3
US-Singapore	59.4
Korea-Singapore	59.8
Mexico-EU	61.2
AFTA	90.1
AFTA-China	-

Based on CPC classification: Total=138 sectors

Table 4 sets out the shares of the sub-sectors that are reserved and compares these shares to those in the commitments made in GATS by the member economies.<sup>2</sup> The results at sectoral level are reported in Table A-5 at the end of the report.

Most regional agreements include more far-reaching commitments than evident under GATS. While GATS commitments are often minimal, in the regional agreements, remarkable progress appears to be made in many sectors, especially, transport services, and in many regions, with the exception of AFAS. Some members of ASEAN have made less advanced commitments under the framework of that regional trade agreement, as pointed out in Nikomborirak and Stephenson (2001), mainly a result of the imposition of restrictions rather than an increase in the number of sectoral exclusions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> GATS data are from

[http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/serv\\_e/serv\\_commitments\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm)

<sup>3</sup> In some cases, commitments in regional agreements appear to be less than those in the GATS. This could arise from differences of the dates in which the agreements entered into force and because of different approaches in sectoral classifications.

**Table 4: Scoring results on sectoral exclusions (% of exclusions)**

		Mode 1 and 2		Mode 3		Mode 4	
			GATS		GATS		GATS
AFTA		90.1	83.9	48.5	89.6	37.6	80.1
	Brunei	83.3	96.4	99.3	99.3	83.3	87.7
	Cambodia	92.0	63.8	92.8	60.9	84.1	40.6
	Indonesia	98.6	91.3	100.0	96.4	98.6	93.5
	Laos	87.0	-	89.1	-	95.7	-
	Malaysia	84.8	65.2	97.8	91.3	91.3	63.0
	Myanmar	94.9	87.7	100.0	99.3	98.6	99.3
	Philippines	92.0	91.3	98.6	91.3	97.8	86.2
	Singapore	86.2	79.7	90.6	81.2	92.8	88.4
	Thailand	90.6	95.7	89.1	97.1	87.0	81.9
Vietnam	92.0	-	100.0	-	83.3	-	
AFTA-China		100.0	78.2	100.0	93.7	100.0	66.8
	AFTA	100.0	83.9	100.0	89.6	100.0	80.1
	China	100.0	72.5	100.0	97.8	100.0	53.6
Australia-US		23.6	51.4	29.0	58.0	23.6	44.6
	Australia	22.5	51.4	34.8	52.2	22.5	47.1
	USA	24.6	51.4	23.2	63.8	24.6	42.0
CER		8.0	55.1	8.0	56.5	8.0	47.8
	Australia	6.5	51.4	6.5	52.2	6.5	47.1
	New Zealand	9.4	58.7	9.4	60.9	9.4	48.6
Chile-Korea		46.4	84.8	35.5	84.4	46.4	67.8
	Chile	42.0	93.5	29.7	94.9	42.0	84.8
	Korea	50.7	76.1	41.3	73.9	50.7	50.7
EFTA		43.7	50.9	100.0	59.4	66.7	46.0
	Iceland	41.3	52.2	42.4	60.1	48.6	42.8
	Liechtenstein	45.7	42.8	95.7	46.4	91.2	38.4
	Norway	47.8	63.8	39.1	70.3	54.3	55.8
	Switzerland	39.9	44.9	45.7	60.9	42.8	47.1
EU-Mexico		61.2	53.3	44.2	62.3	43.7	68.8
	EU (Avg.)	46.4	46.4	41.3	48.5	41.3	37.6
	Mexico	76.1	76.1	48.6	100.0	47.8	66.7
Japan-Mexico		53.3	62.0	42.8	77.2	53.3	52.5
	Japan	48.6	47.8	30.4	54.3	48.6	38.4
	Mexico	58.0	76.1	55.1	100.0	58.0	66.7
Japan-Singapore		46.7	63.8	53.6	67.8	62.7	63.4
	Japan	44.2	47.8	55.1	54.3	25.4	38.4
	Singapore	49.3	79.7	52.2	81.2	100.0	88.4
Korea-Singapore		59.8	77.9	55.1	77.5	49.3	69.6
	Korea	70.3	76.1	60.1	73.9	59.4	50.7
	Singapore	49.3	79.7	50.0	81.2	39.1	88.4
NAFTA		37.2	64.5	37.2	76.3	37.2	56.3
	Canada	30.4	51.4	20.3	63.8	30.4	42.0
	Mexico	45.7	65.9	55.8	65.2	45.7	60.1
	USA	35.5	76.1	35.5	100.0	35.5	66.7
Singapore-US		59.4	65.6	39.9	72.5	39.9	65.2
	Singapore	49.3	79.7	74.2	81.2	52.2	88.4
	USA	69.6	51.4	47.1	63.8	45.7	42.0

Meanwhile, the importance of sectoral commitments is significantly affected by horizontal commitments or reservations. Table 5(a) lists the commonly applied restrictions on horizontal commitments and in comparison Table 5(b) illustrates some of the common sectoral restrictions.

In horizontal commitments, substantial restrictions have been imposed on the supply of a service, in particular, in mode 3 for the negative-list agreements and in modes 3 and 4 for the positive-list agreements. Although direct restrictions on entry (market access and local presence) are common in a lot of agreements, indirect restrictions related to domestic regulations are also significant (such as those related to recognition of qualifications and certifications for mode 1 and 2). AFAS, for example, shows a wide range of reservations which may considerably undermine the effect of liberalization measures.

In AFAS, many limitations dismantling the effectiveness of liberalization are imposed in horizontal commitments, for instance, restrictions on the form of establishment and the dominance of domestic labour law are explicitly designated, so that the number of sectors committed to liberalization may not always be a proper indicator of the degree of liberalization. This point is more likely to be the case for mode 4 transactions where sectoral commitments in a positive-list agreement are frequently described as ‘Unbound except as indicated in the horizontal section’ and few sectoral limitations are added, which may in part suggest that the regulation on this transaction mode is less sensitive to the sector involved. In horizontal commitments, the coverage of persons who are eligible to enter the market is often strictly regulated (e.g. only skilled workers,

managers and directors, or intra-corporate transferees), so that the sectoral coverage of commitments may not be so important.

**Table 5(a): Horizontal Commitments (Reservations)**

Agreements	Commitments
NAFTA	Ownership restrictions for enterprises (including both private and public enterprises (3))* Review on direct acquisitions of large assets (3) Limited majority of foreign board of directors (3) Residency requirements for ownership (3) Restrictions on land acquisitions (3) Requirement for local presence (all) Aboriginal affairs (all)
EFTA	Denial of benefits for enterprises with less substantial presence (3) Considerations for balanced proportion of national and foreign capital, the number of foreigners relative to local population, balanced number of jobs in comparison with the number of the resident population, balanced geographic situation and balanced development of the national economy (all) Requirement for licences and qualifications (all) Residential requirement (all) Restrictions on land acquisitions (3) Restrictions on the foreign managing directors and board of directors (3) Restricted eligibility for subsidies (all)
Mexico-EU	Limitations on the categories of persons eligible for the entry (4) Allowed period of stay (4) Requirements for working experience prior to the entry (4) Requirements for qualifications (4) Restrictions on the number of persons (4) Restrictions on land acquisitions (3) Restrictions on acquisition or sale of bonds and treasury bills (3)
US-Singapore	Restrictions on the sale of shares owned by state enterprises (3) Limitations on equity ownership (3) Nationality and residential requirement for registration of business and local manager (all) Land acquisitions and usage (3) The right to adopt or maintain limitations for market access in a manner which is not inconsistent with GATS (all) The right to adopt or maintain limitations for national treatment under any international agreement in force (all) Minority affairs (all)
AFAS	Restrictions on the nationality of board of directors (3) Categories of persons allowed to enter a member country (4) Requirement for licences for establishing enterprises (3) Restrictions on the type of establishment (e.g. joint venture, limited liability enterprise) (3) Restrictions on capital ownership (3) Applicability of the Labour Law and Immigration Law (4) Land acquisitions (3) Requirements for professional qualifications (3, 4) Period of entry (4) Applicability of an economic needs test for intra-corporate transfer of experts (4) Discriminated profit tax for foreign enterprises (3) Restrictions on acquisitions, mergers and take-overs (3) Limitations on the access to domestic credit (3) Limitations on access to incentives (3)

\*: Transaction mode in parentheses.

**Table 5(a) (Cont): Horizontal Commitments (Reservations)**

<b>Agreements</b>	<b>Commitments</b>
AFTA-China	Under negotiation
Japan-Singapore	Restrictions on the access to subsidies and incentives (3, 4) Obligations for employment of the manager and director who are locally resident (3, 4) Land acquisitions (3) Regulation on local currency transactions (3) Exceptions for national treatment on the privatization of assets owned by the government (3) Limitations on permanent residents (3) Period of entry (4) Categories of persons allowed to enter a member country (4) No national treatment for the mode 4 entry into Singapore (4)
Japan-Mexico	Nationality requirements for board of director (3) Restrictions on foreign ownership (3) Restricted access to subsidies (3, 4) The right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to new services (1,2,4) Restrictions on acquisition or sale of bonds and treasury bills (3)
Chile-Korea	Land acquisitions (3) Employment requirement for local residents (1,2) Residency requirement (local presence) (1,2) Aboriginal affairs (all) Restrictions on the acquisitions of sold or disposed equity interests and assets of existing state enterprises (3) Required authorization for capital transactions of non-residents (3)
Korea-Singapore	Restrictions on the supply of a service through mode 4 (all) Authorization for capital transactions of non-residents (3) Restrictions on the acquisitions of sold or disposed equity interests and assets of existing state enterprises (3) Land acquisitions (3) Minority affairs (all)
Australia-US	All existing non-conforming measures at the regional level of government (all) Applicability of restrictions on large investment for some corporations in all sectors
CER	No horizontal reservations

**Table 5(b): Reservations on Specific Commitments for Selected Sectors**

Sectors	Reservations often applied
Business Services	Restrictions on the number of services suppliers (1,2)* Qualifications of persons, directors or enterprises (1,2,3) Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3) Restrictions on foreign ownership and board of directors (3) Minimum number of local nationality (1,2) Experiences prior to the entry (1,2) Local presence (1,2) Specific requirements for certifications and licences (1,2)
Communication Services	Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3) Monopoly by a local company for some services (3) Prior notification requirement for investment by foreigners on telecommunication services (3) Local nationality requirement for enterprises (3) Limit on foreign participation for some businesses (3) Restrictions on foreign ownership (3)
Distribution Services Financial Services	Local presence (1,2) Commercial presence (1,2) Licences for particular businesses (1,2,3) Laws on protection of confidentiality of information (1,2,3)
Health Related and Social Services	Qualifications of persons, directors or enterprises (1,2,3) Registration requirement for a service supplier (1,2,3)
Transport Services	Foreign ownership and control of, and operation of vessels and air services Pollution control, barge inspection standards, water quality, pilotage, salvage, drug abuse control and maritime communications. Certification, licensing and citizenship requirements for crew members Manning requirements Monopoly by a local company for some sectors Authorization by the government Residential restrictions and nationality restrictions

\*: Transaction mode in parentheses.

## 2-3. GATS template vs. NAFTA template

NAFTA-type agreements are likely to cover liberalization measures more comprehensively (see Table A-4 in appendix). The provisions which would be important for the conduct of trade and investment in services, e.g. those on domestic regulations, monopolies, and transparency, are more often found in this type of agreement than in the GATS-type. This may be due partly to the structure of the text, since in the NAFTA template these measures are treated independently of the chapter of trade in services and are applicable to all the goods and services traded, unlike the GATS template where

most of measures are generally prescribed in the services chapter<sup>4</sup>. There are few cases in which services are excluded from the provisions of the independent chapters, although the exclusion of services is more common in government procurement.

Investment in services and the movement of people are treated in an independent chapter in more recent agreements. However in some agreements such as Japan-Singapore agreement and AFAS, investment liberalization in services sectors is treated in both the services chapter (mode 3) and in an independent investment chapter or another investment agreement. And the priority of the application of the regulation is not clearly specified. Although the Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area specifies that investment in services sectors is regulated in AFAS, the Japan-Singapore agreement does not always clarify the relationship between investment and the services chapter, which may thus lead to a confusion of the interpretations. In addition, the separate investment chapter is in line with the negative-list approach and its horizontal commitments (reservations) may be applicable to services sectors as well (this is a topic for further work).<sup>5</sup>

Generally in most NAFTA-like agreements, the future negotiation process is presented in the text, while GATS-like agreements often appear to do no more than reiterate the bindings of the GATS. As often pointed out, GATS provisions are on the whole less liberal than actual policy. Countries which prefer the positive-list approach appear to

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<sup>4</sup> However, recent agreements based on the GATS template tend to provide these measures in an independent chapter.

<sup>5</sup> The treatment for the mode 4 transaction also includes the similar problem. Namely, movement of natural persons is also stipulated in an independent chapter. However, the annex on this chapter usually corresponds to the horizontal commitment for the mode 4 services transaction.



have aimed at restraining liberalization to the minimum level. For example, the ASEAN services trade agreement (AFAS) has adopted a GATS-plus approach, which aims at expanding the sectoral coverage through regular negotiation. In the sense that it establishes the minimum level of liberalization and extends the liberalization step by step without a setback, this approach seems to promote future liberalization. However, an extremely limited number of sectors have been included in each member's commitments in AFAS at this stage. The commitments to date have been revised four times since the agreement was signed, that is, 1997, 1998, 2001, and 2004, and the services sectors contained in the positive list have gradually increased, but a lot of restrictions have been attached to the liberalized items. Consequently, the current AFAS has not been so effective in promoting services trade liberalization in this region: according to a study of AFAS at sectoral level (Nikomborirak and Stephenson (2001)), it remains less liberal than the GATS.

The ASEAN-China agreement is still under negotiation, and at this stage, provisions on services have not been well stipulated and only an endeavour for future liberalization has been proposed. However even if it is formally ratified, the experience to date in ASEAN suggests that the liberalization between China and ASEAN would not be ambitious.

To conclude, based on the observation of these agreements, the extent of liberalization does not significantly differ between approaches to documenting commitments, but the choice may contribute to differences in the effectiveness of the future liberalization.

### **3. Domestic Regulation**

Provisions on the regulatory conduct of a member country in a non-discriminatory manner are essential to services trade liberalization. However, as the scoring results in Table A-4 in appendix reveal, agreements offering this article are not popular. Although GATS stipulates this provision and attempts to facilitate the coordination and cooperation of non-discriminatory restrictions among members, especially through licensing and recognition of qualifications, many regional agreements to date appear reluctant to commit these issues. Many regional services agreements have not had the power to enforce effective liberalization and indirect restrictions continue to be imposed on the activities of service providers within a member country. In addition, federal states such as USA and Canada generally have allowed each state or province to adopt their own non-discriminatory regulations, which makes regulatory situation even more complicated.

A large number of reservations or restrictions on documented commitments appear to be associated with domestic regulations. For example, foreign suppliers' entry into the business (professional) services sector requires local (domestic) licences. On trade in services through mode 4, domestic labour law is frequently applied to persons who enter the country for supplying services. In most cases the terms and conditions of entry must follow the rules stipulated in domestic law.

Mutual recognition will be a necessary procedure for cross-border transactions of services and is offered in many agreements. The provisions seem to be, as a whole, more strictly binding than those in the GATS. However, as stated earlier, most sectoral

commitments also provide restrictions on (that is, reservations which refer to) qualifications of services providers, in particular, in professional services, transport services, telecommunication services, and financial services, as illustrated in Table 5(b).

Regulations on transfers payments and transparency are common in regional agreements. The former appears to be more liberal except when balance of payments problems arise, but regarding the latter, there is a large gap between form and content. Some measures for maintaining transparency of rules such as publishing and notification requirements exist in most agreements, but the transparency of the contents themselves seems to be disappointing since the format of the contents has not always been standardized. In particular, the status-quo regulatory structure generally is not made clear in the positive-list approach.

Treatment regulating subsidies and business practices in services sectors seems less prevalent in regional agreements, and only the Japan-Singapore agreement, Australia-US agreement, and CER include a provision on business practice. The possibility of discriminatory treatment on subsidies is specified in services chapters in most cases. Regulations on monopolies and exclusive suppliers are often treated in a separate chapter, which is horizontally applicable to the industries other than services. Anti-competitive behaviour is in principle prohibited, but the application of this rule has been excluded in some key sectors such as telecommunications and transport services where a few domestic providers are empowered to supply services monopolistically.

#### **4. Market access and national treatment**

Market access and national treatment are fundamental principles in the liberalization of trade and investment in services. While the distinction between market access and national treatment actually appears ambiguous in the case of services, applying the guidelines for this distinction published by WTO, the restrictions on national treatment often found in the twelve agreements are associated with the residency requirements (including prior residence) and limited access to subsidies. In many agreements professional services suppliers are required to be a resident, which is inconsistent with the principle of non-residency. According to the Japan-Singapore agreement, only Japanese firms can access to R&D subsidies in Japan, and more general limitations on access to subsidies by suppliers of the other party are found in the Japan-Mexico agreement (e.g. see Table 5(a) on horizontal commitments).

The treatment of market access and national treatment differs between the GATS approach and NAFTA counterpart. The agreements adopting a negative-list approach, for example, Chile-Korea, Korea-Singapore, and Australia-US, stipulate the adoption of national treatment and market access in a *general* manner, unlike GATS or GATS-like agreements such as Japan-Singapore in which these provisions are treated as specific commitments and are applied only to the sectors listed by each member as sectoral commitments. In this sense, the former appears to be more liberal.

On the other hand, a greater number of limitations on market access have been retained in many sectors, and in forms such as nationality requirements, rules on foreign

ownership<sup>6</sup> and on the form of establishment (e.g. use of joint ventures), and restrictions on the total number of service operations (quantitative restrictions). These restrictions on market access appear to have been the more serious impediments for liberalization of trade in services.

Limitations on market access protect domestic market rents. Because most of sectoral exclusions are relevant to market access, a comparison of the number of such reservations may give a picture of the difference in the extent of market access between agreements. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that bilateral agreements between developed countries, e.g. Australia-US and CER, are likely to have a smaller number of exclusions whereas all agreements involving less-developed countries and agreements with multiple members tend to have many sectoral reservations. This finding may suggest that developed countries where services suppliers are well-developed and the market size of services is relatively significant may have an incentive to share or exchange access to rents via a bilateral agreement while providing protection from suppliers in other regions. On the other hand, developing countries in which services markets and their suppliers are still immature are more likely to protect rents within their own national boundary.

## **5. Comparison between bilateral and multiple member agreements**

There are no clear differences between bilateral and multiple-member agreements with regard to the form or contents. The choice of the binding-style with regard to sectoral

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<sup>6</sup> This is included in the limitations on national treatment as well.

commitments seems to be less dependent on whether an agreement is bilateral or multiple-member. In addition, the sectoral exclusions or reservations do not also appear to be affected by this dimension of the agreement.

Provisions on domestic regulations are more likely to be included in bilateral agreements (e.g. US-Singapore, Japan-Singapore, Korea-Singapore, Australia-US). Regarding mutual recognition, bilateral agreements tend to contain more liberal provisions than GATS. On mode 3 transactions, bilateral agreements more often include a chapter on investment or more liberal provisions on investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, on nationality (residency) of management and board of directors, and on performance requirements. Although these findings might indicate that bilateral agreements may tend to contain broader coverage than agreements with more than two members, restrictions remain even on these items: these are listed in within the specific commitments, regardless of the type of agreement.

## **6. Rules of Origin**

Many agreements have a provision on rules of origin, In general, this regulation provides two cases to which the denial of benefits is applied; (1) no substantive business operations in the territory of other parties, and (2) services supplied by a firm owned by persons in a non-party.

Some agreements, for example, Japan-Singapore and Korea-Singapore, contain an independent article on the denial of benefits while other agreements, such as

EU-Mexico, include the possibility to deny the benefits for suppliers which have no substantial business operations in the territory of the other parties in the article on the coverage or definition of services.

Services supplied by the firms which are outsourcing to non-parties who are not eligible for the benefits from the agreement may not meet the rule of origin. However often it will be difficult to specify the origin of the services, unlike the case of manufactured goods, in particular, in the service industries where e-commerce is used an important tool for cross-boarder trade.

## **7. Overall evaluation on liberalization**

Lastly, we evaluate the degree of services liberalization for each agreement. One way to carry out the evaluation is to compute the average of the scores for each item in the scoring system and then assess each agreement according to its average score. Yet, the importance or weight of each item is assumed to be the same in this procedure.

This study instead employs factor analysis to determine the appropriate weights on each item. The factor analysis was based on the larger sample (80 agreements) and, using the scoring result for each item, common factors which may characterize the degree of liberalization of these agreements were extracted. The first factor appears to represent an overall indicator of services liberalization because a greater value is allocated both to the main measures of form such as national treatment and market access and to various measures of contents. In addition, the first factor explains 50% of the total variances,

thus indicating the validity of using this factor as a source of the weights. This result is also valid for all modes of trade in services. The components of the first factor were then used to determine the weight for each scoring item. The main results of the factor analysis are reported in Table 6.<sup>7</sup>

According to this procedure, EFTA, AFTA, Australia-US and CER are judged as more liberal for cross-boarder trade. It might be surprising that AFTA has been regarded as quite liberal, but the fundamental form may be relatively well-established because it adopts GATS-plus approach. CER, Mexico-EU, Japan-Mexico and EFTA take a larger value for mode 3 and EFTA, CER, and Chile-Korea do for mode 4 transactions. It is evident that CER is considerably liberal for all modes of trade in services.

Moreover, the results indicate that the agreements based on a negative-list binding format are not necessarily more liberal than those following a positive-list binding form. For example, the US-Singapore and Chile-Korea agreement are not so liberal even though they are built on the negative-list approach.

We should note that the overall scores obtained from the factor analysis are correlated with those from the simple average value. For example, excluding AFTA-China which is still under negotiation, the correlation coefficient is 0.22 for mode 1 and 2, 0.31 for mode 3 and 0.43 for mode 4. However, as shown in Table 7, the rank correlation of the measures is not statistically significant with the exception of mode 4.

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<sup>7</sup> The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, reported in the Table, supports the validity of using the sample for implementing the factor analysis.



**Table 6: Results of Factor Analysis**

**(1) Mode 1 and 2**

(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test: 0.808

(b) Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	13.2	50.8	50.8
2	2.3	8.9	59.7
3	1.9	7.5	67.2
4	1.6	6.1	73.2
5	1.3	5.1	78.3

(c) Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Form</i>					
Scope	0.770	0.233	0.335	0.143	0.207
MFN	0.693	0.356	0.101	0.205	0.103
MFN Exemption	0.087	0.122	0.020	0.041	0.555
National Treatment	0.649	0.594	0.327	-0.007	0.121
Market Access	0.474	0.536	0.197	0.289	0.253
Local Presence	0.192	0.876	-0.009	0.062	0.141
Domestic Regulations	0.144	0.120	0.420	0.800	0.261
Transparency	0.072	0.436	0.597	0.169	0.330
Recognition	0.547	0.555	0.277	0.294	0.021
Monopolies	0.319	0.072	0.792	0.180	0.226
Business Practices	0.302	-0.070	0.294	0.462	-0.173
Transfer and Payments	0.367	-0.016	0.781	0.297	-0.169
Denial of Benefits	0.627	0.482	0.241	0.346	0.148
Safeguard	-0.421	-0.208	0.098	-0.332	0.260
Subsidies	0.251	-0.174	0.130	0.472	0.535
Government Procurement	0.207	0.310	0.636	0.229	0.104
Ratchet Mechanism	0.399	0.720	0.141	-0.236	-0.178
Telecommunication	0.206	0.544	0.388	0.423	0.067
Financial Services	0.286	0.281	0.242	0.456	0.063
<i>Contents</i>					
Excluded Modes	0.811	0.271	0.358	0.187	0.105
Excluded Form	0.840	0.225	0.256	0.181	0.061
Sectoral Exclusions	0.408	0.077	0.335	-0.134	0.474
Regional Measures	0.819	0.197	0.299	0.082	0.235
Land Acquisitions	0.871	0.250	0.273	0.058	0.145
Minority Affairs	0.891	0.017	-0.033	0.264	0.099
Number of Domestic Employees	0.777	0.257	0.309	0.268	0.046

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

**Table 6(Cont): Results of Factor Analysis**

**(2) Mode 3**

(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test: 0.866

(b) Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	11.7	48.8	48.8
2	2.6	11.0	59.9
3	1.5	6.3	66.1
4	1.2	5.2	71.3
5	1.2	4.9	76.2
6	1.0	4.2	80.4

(c) Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Form</i>						
Coverage	0.559	0.532	0.359	0.253	0.226	-0.196
Scope	0.600	0.399	0.419	0.205	0.167	0.323
MFN	0.421	0.333	0.158	0.611	0.083	0.435
MFN Exemption	0.276	0.407	-0.117	0.233	0.031	-0.032
National Treatment	0.558	0.474	0.376	0.443	0.272	-0.022
Nationality of directors	0.184	0.578	0.144	0.254	-0.222	-0.015
Performance Requirement	0.227	0.596	0.173	0.167	-0.029	0.212
Transparency	0.061	0.125	0.859	0.024	0.148	0.157
Denial of Benefits	0.405	0.502	0.107	0.208	0.046	0.539
Expropriation	0.085	0.929	0.184	-0.041	0.030	0.019
Transfer and Payments	0.550	0.162	0.388	0.131	0.468	0.068
Dispute Settlement	0.133	0.873	0.048	-0.003	0.083	0.007
Safeguard	-0.118	0.107	-0.046	0.000	-0.542	-0.146
Subsidy	0.128	-0.078	0.136	0.029	0.167	0.493
Government Procurement	0.305	0.170	0.541	0.104	-0.017	0.103
Ratchet Mechanism	0.199	0.581	0.191	0.415	-0.206	0.023
<i>Contents</i>						
Excluded Form	0.567	0.240	0.191	0.506	0.395	0.307
Sectoral Exclusions	0.395	0.394	0.166	-0.011	0.287	-0.010
Regional Measures	0.645	0.203	0.395	0.217	0.461	0.222
Land Acquisitions	0.767	0.170	-0.054	0.214	-0.118	-0.036
Minority Affairs	0.818	0.046	0.071	0.136	0.262	0.266
Prior Residence	0.736	0.365	0.356	0.136	0.144	0.248
Foreign Participation	0.794	0.328	0.251	0.089	0.067	0.159
Large Investment	0.752	0.203	0.188	0.033	0.182	0.307

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

**Table 6(Cont): Results of Factor Analysis**

**(3) Mode 4**

(a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test: 0.870

(b) Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	13.2	50.8	50.8
2	2.3	8.9	59.7
3	1.9	7.5	67.2
4	1.6	6.1	73.2
5	1.3	5.1	78.3

(c) Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
<i>Form</i>				
Coverage	0.665	0.642	0.118	0.253
scope	0.592	0.372	0.158	0.392
Immigration	0.077	-0.006	-0.125	0.476
MFN_Mode 4 Delivery	0.703	0.206	0.260	-0.100
MFN Exemption	0.060	0.041	0.176	0.470
National Treatment_Mode4	0.693	0.576	0.202	0.045
Market Access	0.566	0.461	0.379	0.188
Domestic Regulations	0.291	0.013	0.806	0.061
Transparency_Mode4	0.256	0.389	0.640	0.163
Transparency_Movement of People	0.187	0.622	0.221	0.157
Recognition	0.585	0.494	0.368	0.065
Denial of Benefits	0.720	0.352	0.485	-0.193
Ratchet Mechanism	0.429	0.766	-0.102	-0.296
<i>Contents</i>				
Excluded Form	0.845	0.183	0.159	0.161
Sectoral Exclusions	0.307	0.259	0.314	0.591
Regional Measures	0.887	0.203	0.306	0.185
Skill of workers	0.762	0.290	-0.081	0.447
Short-Term Entry	0.846	0.363	0.078	0.246
Long-Term Entry	0.822	0.341	0.070	0.281
Number of Quotas	0.878	0.292	0.191	0.195
Labour Market Testing	0.081	0.462	0.059	0.095
Land Acquisitions	0.869	0.302	0.267	0.132
Minority Affairs	0.850	0.045	0.173	0.063
Number of Domestic Employees	0.776	0.171	0.288	0.185

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

As a consequence, the question arises of which overall indicator should be chosen. If we need to measure the degree of liberalization more exactly, and since the importance of each item varies, each item should be differently weighted. Factor analysis can be used to provide those weights. In particular, if we are concerned about the exact ranking of regional agreements on the extent of liberalization, this indicator will be more appropriate than the simple average. However, where we aim simply to obtain an assessment of the approximate degree of liberalization, the simple average which avoids the complicated estimation process of factor analysis is preferred. In addition, this indicator avoids the problem of factor analysis that its results may change with the sample used in estimation. For example, because more recent agreements are likely to be more sophisticated and liberal in terms of the coverage of liberalization measures, factor analysis may extract different factors depending on the sample period. Because this study covers all the past agreements notified by WTO, this problem may not be serious, but where the sample of agreements is small and this bias is thus expected to be large, the simple average score is preferred.

**Table 7: Comparison of ranking based on the extent of liberalization**

Mode 1 and 2			
Simple Averages		Factor Analysis	
1 Australia-US	0.810	CER	9.085
2 CER	0.685	Australia-US	8.601
3 Japan-Singapore	0.656	EFTA	8.296
4 US-Singapore	0.652	AFTA	8.048
5 Korea-Singapore	0.617	Japan-Singapore	7.924
6 NAFTA	0.598	Mexico-EU	7.445
7 EFTA	0.525	NAFTA	7.234
8 Chile-Korea	0.508	US-Singapore	6.958
9 Japan-Mexico	0.502	Korea-Singapore	6.645
10 AFTA	0.481	Japan-Mexico	6.370
11 Mexico-EU	0.475	Chile-Korea	5.471
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.427			
Mode 3			
Simple Averages		Factor Analysis	
1 Japan-Mexico	0.740	CER	7.950
2 Australia-US	0.723	Mexico-EU	7.872
3 US-Singapore	0.719	Japan-Mexico	7.716
4 NAFTA	0.667	EFTA	7.706
5 Chile-Korea	0.654	Australia-US	7.379
6 CER	0.652	US-Singapore	7.241
7 Korea-Singapore	0.638	NAFTA	6.871
8 Mexico-EU	0.583	Chile-Korea	6.835
9 EFTA	0.571	Korea-Singapore	6.509
10 Japan-Singapore	0.529	Japan-Singapore	6.469
11 AFTA	0.458	AFTA	5.583
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.409			
Mode 4			
Simple Averages		Factor Analysis	
1 CER	0.656	EFTA	11.231
2 Korea-Singapore	0.632	CER	11.072
3 US-Singapore	0.618	Korea-Singapore	9.904
4 EFTA	0.606	Mexico-EU	9.514
5 Chile-Korea	0.584	Japan-Mexico	9.492
6 Japan-Mexico	0.538	US-Singapore	9.251
7 NAFTA	0.534	Chile-Korea	9.131
8 Japan-Singapore	0.520	AFTA	9.036
9 Mexico-EU	0.510	Japan-Singapore	8.886
10 Australia-US	0.496	NAFTA	8.338
11 AFTA	0.440	Australia-US	7.320
Rank Correlation Coefficients: 0.682**			

\*\* : Significant at 5% level.

## 8. Summary

All the agreements examined include a treatment of services. However a review of the form and content of agreement finds a wide range of approaches, with respect to listing commitments, the adoption of sectoral classification schemes, the interaction of sectoral and horizontal commitments, and the treatment of investment. The variety of approaches and the variations in sectoral coverage (either through their exclusions, or through reservations or through the overriding effects of horizontal clauses) suggest that extension of any benefits to non-members will be difficult. The processes of further steps in liberalisation are not often specified in the GATS type agreements but are more likely to be specified in NAFTA style negative-list agreements.

Where data are available, commitments with respect to sectoral matters appear to be wider-ranging advanced compared to those already made in the GATS, but constrained by horizontal commitments or other reservations or restrictions. With respect to other provisions, such as domestic regulation, mutual recognition, subsidies, repatriation of funds, transparency and anti-competitive practices, there are some instances where the agreements offer a wider coverage, but also in those cases reservations continued to be applied.

The agreements adopting the NAFTA-template generally seem to pursue more liberal stance for trade in services in the *form* of agreement such as leeway of future negotiation, general provisions on national treatment and market access and coverage of liberalizing measures, but the actual effectiveness of agreements, influenced by the horizontal and specific commitments, have been considerably diminished by sectoral

reservations, regardless of the form of agreement.

The features of the agreements vary depending on the participation economies. Table 8, based on the bigger sample of agreements, indicates that the degree of liberalization of trade in services is relatively low in the regional agreements between developing countries. The weighted score denotes the overall score on services liberalization where each score is summed by being weighed by the first principal component representing the extent of liberalization on the form of agreement, as discussed in Section 7. Interestingly, the agreements between developed countries and developing ones are relatively liberal, even compared with the agreements between developed countries. However, the sectoral exclusions are also then relatively large, implying that the substantial impacts of agreements are not always significant.

Table 8: Comparison of liberalization based on the development level

Type of agreement*	Weighted Total Score	% of excluded sectors (Total:138)
Mode 1&2		
Developed-developed	4.681	57.3
Developing-developing	3.866	86.7
Developed-developing	4.948	73.1
Mode 3		
Developed-developed	4.403	58.0
Developing-developing	4.061	87.7
Developed-developing	5.227	71.8
Mode 4		
Developed-developed	6.056	63.1
Developing-developing	5.153	86.4
Developed-developing	6.462	69.6

\*: Based on the WTO classification.

Generally the lack of sectoral coverage, or where a sector is included the presence of reservations, reduces the impact of these agreements on regional services trade. There will be some markets where provisions are made available but where that occurs it is possible that the effect is more likely to lead to sharing of positions in a protected market rather than the introduction of competition. This situation, however, is not unique to bilateral agreements and as noted in other work a bias towards national treatment rather than market access liberalisation is also evident in multilateral negotiation. However by their nature, the tendency in this direction is more likely in preferential negotiation. The extent of this bias is a topic for further work.



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Table A-1 Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services

(1) FORM OF AGREEMENT

	Category	Score
<b>Scope</b>		
	Covers everything	1
	Excludes only air passenger transport or government services	0.8
	Excludes air passenger transport and govt services (same as GATS)	0.75
	Excludes more than GATS (e.g. financial services, maritime transport, audio-visual, govt procurement)	0.5
	Endeavours with unspecified scope (cooperation or no detailed provisions)	0.2
	No services provisions	0
<b>MFN</b>		
	Negative list bindings	1
	Positive list bindings	0.75
	Best endeavours	0.25
	No commitment	0
<b>MFN exemptions</b>		
	None	1
	None for new bilateral agreements	0.5
	Some for new bilateral agreements	0.25
	For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment on MFN	0
<b>National treatment</b>		
	Negative list bindings	1
	Negative list bindings - some sectors	0.75
	Positive list bindings - all sectors	0.5
	Best endeavours	0.25
	No commitment	0
<b>Market access (ie prohibition on quantitative restrictions as in GATS)</b>		
	Negative list bindings	1
	Negative list bindings - some sectors	0.75
	Positive list bindings - all sectors	0.5
	Best endeavours	0.25
	No commitment	0
<b>Local presence not required (right of non-establishment)</b>		
	Has this provision	1
	Has this provision, but with some exemptions	0.5
	Doesn't have this provision	0
<b>Domestic regulation</b>		
	General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent)	1
	General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised restriction)	0.75
	Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner	0.4
	Provisions for specific sectors eg professions	0.25
	No provisions	0
<b>Transparency (scores additive)</b>		
	Prior comment	0.3
	Publish (as in GATS)	0.4
	National inquiry point (as in GATS)	0.3
<b>Recognition</b>		
	General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) plus provisions for all sectors	1
	General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) plus provisions for specific sectors	0.75
	General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)	0.5
	Provisions for specific sectors eg legal, engineering	0.25
	Encouragement	0.2
	No provisions	0

Table A-1(continued) Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services

Category	Score
<b>Monopolies and exclusive services providers</b>	
Stronger than general provisions in GATS	1
General provisions as in GATS (not act inconsistently with commitments, not anticompetitive in other markets)	0.75
General provisions as in GATS plus some exceptions	0.6
Provisions for specific sectors eg telecommunications	0.5
No provisions	0
<b>Business practices</b>	
Stronger than the GATS	1
General provisions as in GATS (consult with a view to eliminating)	0.75
Provisions for specific sectors	0.5
No provisions	0
<b>Transfers and payments</b>	
No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments	1
Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances	0.5
No provisions	0
<b>Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)</b>	
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any) business operations in other party	1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors	0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors	0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions to prevent denial	0
<b>Safeguards</b>	
General provisions	0
Provisions for particular sectors	0.25
Future negotiations	0.5
No provisions or banned	1
<b>Subsidies</b>	
Provisions limiting their use	1
Consultation	0.5
Future negotiations to limit their use	0.25
No provisions	0
<b>Government procurement in services</b>	
Provisions on non-discriminatory access	1
Provisions for access in some sectors	0.75
Future negotiations	0.5
No provisions, or no access	0
<b>Ratchet mechanism</b>	
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound	1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism	0.75
No mechanism	0
<b>Telecommunications (scores additive)</b>	
Interconnection (access to and use of PSTN and services by service suppliers of other party)	0.5
Unbundling	0.1
Particular services (eg leased circuits, resale, number portability)	0.1
Competitive safeguards	0.1
Universal Service Obligations	0.1
Allocation of scarce resources (eg spectrum)	0.1
<b>Financial services (scores additive)</b>	
Prudential carveout	0.4
Provision for recognition of prudential measures	0.2
NT for access to payments and clearing systems	0.1
New financial services	0.1
Privacy	0.1
Data transfer	0.1

Table A-1(continued) Templates for Cross-Border Trade in Services

(2) CONTENT OF AGREEMENT

Category	Score
<b>Excluded modes</b>	
No modes excluded by one or more parties	1
One mode excluded by one or more parties (e.g. mode 4)	0.5
Two or more modes excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions	0
<b>Excluded measures</b>	
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties	1
One measure (e.g. MA) excluded by one or more parties	0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions	0
<b>Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)</b>	
No sectors excluded by one or more parties	1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.75
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.5
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0.25
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0
<b>Measures at regional level</b>	
No measures at sub-national (state or provincial) level excluded	1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties	0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties	0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions on services trade	0
<b>Restrictions on land purchases</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Reservations on Minority</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Requirements on the number of domestic employees</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Provisions asymmetric?</b>	
No	1
Yes	0

Table A-2 Templates for Investment

(1) FORM OF AGREEMENT

Category	Score
<b>Sectoral coverage</b>	
Beyond services (in separate chapter)	1
Services only (mode 3 in services chapter)	0.5
Based on bilateral treaties	0.4
Endeavours without specified scope	0.25
None	0
<b>Scope of MFN, NT etc provisions (scores additive)</b>	
Establishment (i.e. greenfield)	0.3
Acquisition (i.e. merger)	0.2
Post-establishment operation	0.3
Resale (i.e. free movement of capital)	0.2
<b>MFN</b>	
Negative list bindings	1
Positive list bindings	0.75
Best endeavours	0.25
No commitment	0
<b>MFN exemptions</b>	
None	1
None for new bilateral agreements	0.5
Some for new bilateral agreements	0.25
For all existing and new bilateral agreements, or no provisions to prevent exemption:	0
<b>National treatment</b>	
Negative list bindings - all sectors	1
Negative list bindings - some sectors	0.75
Positive list bindings - all sectors	0.5
Best endeavours	0.25
No commitment	0
<b>Nationality (residency) of management and board of directors</b>	
Cannot restrict either	1
Cannot restrict either, with sectoral exceptions	0.75
Can partially restrict board of directors	0.5
Can partially restrict management or both.	
Alternatively, sectoral promises to liberalise, but no general promise.	0.25
No provisions limiting restrictions	0
<b>Performance requirements</b>	
No local content, trade or other specified requirements (e.g. on technology transfer, or where to sell)	1
No local content or trade requirements ie as in TRIMS	0.75
Provisions more limited than TRIMS	0.5
No provisions	0

Table A-2(continued) Templates for Investment

Category	Score
<b>Transparency (scores additive)</b>	
Prior comment	0.3
Publish (as in GATS)	0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS)	0.3
<b>Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)</b>	
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any) business operations in other party	1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors	0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors	0.5
Total denial if owned by third party, or no provisions	0
<b>Expropriation etc. (scores additive)</b>	
Minimum standard of treatment	0.2
Treatment in case of strife	0.4
Expropriation and compensation	0.4
<b>Transfers and payments</b>	
No restrictions except to safeguard balance of payments	1
Restrictions in other prescribed circumstances	0.5
No provisions	0
<b>Investor State dispute settlement</b>	
Yes	1
No	0
<b>Safeguards</b>	
General provisions	0
Provisions for particular sectors	0.25
Future negotiations	0.5
No provisions	1
<b>Subsidies</b>	
Provisions limiting their use	1
Consultation	0.5
Future negotiations	0.25
No provisions	0
<b>Government procurement</b>	
Provisions on non-discriminatory access	1
Provisions for access in some sectors	0.75
Future negotiations	0.5
No provisions, or completely excluded	0
<b>Ratchet mechanism</b>	
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound	1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism	0.75
No mechanism	0

Table A-2(continued) Templates for Investment

## (2) CONTENT OF AGREEMENT

Category	Score
<b>Excluded measures</b>	
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties	1
One measure (eg MA) excluded by one or more parties	0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions	0
<b>Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)</b>	
No sectors excluded by one or more parties	1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.75
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.5
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0.25
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0
<b>Measures at regional level</b>	
No measures at sub-national level excluded	1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties	0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties	0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions on investment	0
<b>Restrictions on land purchases</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Reservations on Minority</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Requirement of prior residence for establishment</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>General restrictions on foreign capital participation</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Review or approvals on large foreign investments (acquisition)</b>	
Not required	1
required	0
<b>Provisions asymmetric?</b>	
No	1
Yes	0

Table A-3 Templates for Movement of People

(1) FORM OF AGREEMENT

	Category	Score
<b>Sectoral coverage</b>		
	Beyond services and investment (separate chapter)	1
	Services and investment (in both services and investment chapters)	0.75
	Services only (mode 4 in services)	0.5
	Endeavours	0.25
	None	0
<b>Scope</b>		
	Allows permanent immigration	1
	Includes access to labour market	0.75
	Temporary movement only	0.5
	No clear scope	0.25
	None	0
<b>Immigration</b>		
	Requires changes to immigration procedures (e.g. visa quotas or eligibility criteria)	1
	Subject to existing immigration laws and procedures, or no provisions	0
<b>MFN for mode 4 delivery</b>		
	Negative list bindings	1
	Positive list bindings	0.75
	Best endeavours	0.25
	No commitment	0
<b>MFN exemptions</b>		
	None	1
	None for new bilateral agreements	0.5
	Some for new bilateral agreements	0.25
	For all existing and new bilateral agreements or no commitment on MFN	0
<b>National treatment for mode 4 delivery</b>		
	Negative list bindings	1
	Negative list bindings - some sectors	0.75
	Positive list bindings - all sectors	0.5
	Best endeavours	0.25
	No commitment	0



Table A-3(continued) Templates for Movement of People

Category	Score
<b>Market access (i.e. prohibition on quantitative restrictions as in GATS)</b>	
Negative list bindings	1
Negative list bindings - some sectors	0.75
Positive list bindings - all sectors	0.5
Best endeavours	0.25
No commitment	0
<b>Domestic regulation</b>	
General provisions as in GATS plus necessity test (or equivalent)	1
General provisions as in GATS (transparency, not a disguised restriction)	0.75
Measures in a reasonable and impartial manner	0.4
Provisions for specific sectors eg professions	0.25
No provisions	0
<b>Transparency of regulations governing service delivery via mode 4 (scores additive)</b>	
Prior comment	0.3
Publish (as in GATS)	0.4
National inquiry point (as in GATS)	0.3
<b>Transparency of regulations governing temporary movement of persons (scores additive)</b>	
Expedite procedures	0.3
Publish	0.4
Answer queries or comments	0.3
<b>Recognition</b>	
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) plus provisions for all sectors	1
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards) plus provisions for specific sectors	0.75
General provisions as in GATS (nondiscrimination, based in international standards)	0.5
Provisions for specific sectors, e.g. legal, engineering	0.25
Endeavor	0.2
No provisions	0
<b>Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)</b>	
Denial only to persons that do not conduct substantial (or any) business operations in other party	1
Tougher treatment to specific sectors	0.75
Tougher treatment to all sectors	0.5
Total denial if owned by third party or no provisions	0
<b>Ratchet mechanism</b>	
All subsequent unilateral liberalisation to be bound	1
Sectoral exceptions to ratchet mechanism	0.75
No mechanism	0

Table A-3(continued) Templates for Movement of People

(2) CONTENT OF AGREEMENT-SERVICE DELIVERY

Category	Score
<b>General reservations/exceptions</b>	
No measures (MFN, NT, MA) excluded by one or more parties	1
One measure (e.g. MA) excluded by one or more parties	0.5
More than one measure excluded by one or more party, or no provisions on movement of people	0
<b>Sectoral exclusions: Total sectors: 138 (based on CPC)</b>	
No sectors excluded by one or more parties	1
25% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.8
25-50% sectors excluded by one or more parties (e.g. maritime, audiovisual)	0.6
50-75% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0.4
75-100% sectors excluded by one or more parties	0.2
<b>Measures at regional level</b>	
No measures at sub-national level excluded	1
Measures at local level excluded by one or more parties	0.7
Measures at State level excluded by one or more parties	0.4
Measures at all subnational levels excluded by one or more parties, or no provisions on movement of people	0

(3) CONTENT OF AGREEMENT-FACILITATION OF MOBILITY

Category	Score
<b>Skill coverage (least generous treatment among members of FTA)</b>	
All groups (including unskilled)	1
All business persons, traders and investors, intracorporate transferees, and professionals	0.5
A subset of the above (eg specialists, managers and intracorporate transferees)	0.25
No groups	0
<b>Short term entry (least generous treatment among members of FTA)</b>	
Over 90 days or no time limit mentioned	1
Up to 90 days	0.75
Up to 60 days	0.5
Up to 30 days	0.25
No short term entry, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors)	0
<b>Long term entry (least generous treatment among members of FTA)</b>	
5 years or more or no time limit mentioned	1
Up to 4 years	0.8
Up to 3 years	0.6
Up to 2 years	0.4
Up to 1 year	0.2
No long term entry, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors)	0
<b>Quotas on numbers of entrants</b>	
No (or not mentioned)	1
Yes, or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors)	0
<b>Needs test</b>	
Prohibited	1
Can be applied (or not mentioned or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors))	0
<b>Local labour market testing or other criteria</b>	
All such tests prohibited or not required	1
Some such tests prohibited or not required	0.5
No prohibitions (or not mentioned or in the case of unbinding service provisions (e.g. endeavors))	0
<b>Restrictions on land purchases</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Considerations on Minority</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Requirements on the number of domestic employees</b>	
No	1
Yes or no services provisions	0
<b>Provisions asymmetric?</b>	
No	1
Yes	0

Table A-4: CROSS BORDER TRADE (Mode 1 and 2)

	NAFTA	EFTA	Mexico-EU	US-Singapore	AFTA	AFTA-China	Japan-Singapore	Japan-Mexico	Chile-Korea	Korea-Singapore	Australia-US	CER
<b>FORM OF AGREEMENT</b>												
Scope	0.75	0.5	0.5	0.75	1	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.8
MFN	1	1	1	1	1	0.25	0	1	0	0	1	1
MFN exemptions	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
National treatment	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	1	1	1	1	1
Market access (i.e. prohibition on QRs as in	0	0	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	1	1	1
Local presence not required (right of non-establishment)	0.5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Domestic regulation	0	0	0	0.75	0	0	0.75	0	0	0.75	0.75	0.75
Transparency	0.7	0.4	0	0.7	0	0	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.3	1	0.4
Recognition	0.75	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.5	0	1	0.2	0	0.75	0.75	0.5
Monopolies and exclusive services providers	1	0.75	0	1	0	0	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1	0.6
Business practices	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.75	0	0	0	1	0
Transfers and payments	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.5	0
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)	0.5	0	1	1	1	0	0.75	1	1	1	1	1
Safeguards	1	0.25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Subsidies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Government procurement in services	0.75	0.75	0	0.75	0	0	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0
Ratchet mechanism	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Telecommunications	0.5	0	0	1	0	0	0.8	0	0	1	1	0
Financial services	0.2	0	0.6	0.8	0	0	0.3	0.6	0	0	0.9	0
<b>CONTENT OF AGREEMENT</b>												
Exclusion of modes: Model and 2, 3, 4	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	1	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	1
Exclusion of measures: MFN, NT, MA	0	1	1	0.5	1	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1
Sectoral exclusions						See Table A-5						
Regional exclusions	0.4	1	1	0.7	1	0	1	0.7	1	1	0.4	1
Restrictions on land purchases	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Reservations on Minority	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Symmetry of provisions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>Simple average</b>	0.598	0.525	0.475	0.652	0.481	0.094	0.656	0.502	0.508	0.617	0.810	0.685
<b>Total score</b>	7.234	8.296	7.445	6.958	8.048	-0.094	7.924	6.370	5.471	6.645	8.601	9.085

**Table A-4 (Cont): Scoring Results - Investment (Mode 3)**

	NAFTA	EFTA	Mexico-EU	US-Singapore	AFTA	AFTA-China	Japan-Singapore	Japan-Mexico	Chile-Korea	Korea-Singapore	Australia-US	CER
<b>FORM OF AGREEMENT</b>												
Sectoral coverage	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	0.5
Scope of MFN, NT etc provisions	1	0.8	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
MFN	1	1	1	1	1	0.25	0	1	1	0	1	1
MFN exemptions	1	0	0.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	1
National treatment	1	1	0.75	1	0.5	0	0.75	1	1	1	1	1
Nationality (residency) of management and board of directors	0.25	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.75	0
Performance requirements	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Transparency	0.7	0.4	0	0.7	0	0	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.4
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)	0.5	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.5	1	1	1
Expropriation etc.	0.4	0	0	0.6	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Transfers and payments	0.5	1	1	1	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0
Investor State dispute settlement	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
Safeguards	1	0.25	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Subsidies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Government procurement	0.75	0.75	0	0.75	0	0	0	0.75	0	0.75	0.75	0
Ratchet mechanism	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
<b>CONTENT OF AGREEMENT</b>												
Exclusion of measures: MFN, NT, MA	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	1
Sectoral exclusions						See Table A-5						
Regional exclusions	0.4	1	1	0.7	1	0	1	0.7	1	1	0.4	1
Restrictions on land purchases	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Reservations on minority	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
General restrictions on foreign capital	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Review or approvals on large foreign investments (acquisition)	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Symmetry of provisions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>Simple average</b>	0.667	0.571	0.583	0.719	0.458	0.115	0.529	0.740	0.654	0.638	0.723	0.652
<b>Total score</b>	6.871	7.706	7.872	7.241	5.583	0.267	6.469	7.716	6.835	6.509	7.379	7.950

**Table A-4 (continued): MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE (Mode 4)**

	NAFTA	EFTA	Mexico-EU	US-Singapore	AFTA	ASEAN-China	Japan-Singapore	Japan-Mexico	Chile-Korea	Korea-Sing	AUSFTA	CER
<b>FORM OF AGREEMENT</b>												
Sectoral coverage	1	1	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	0.5
Scope	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0
Immigration	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MFN for mode 4 delivery	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
MFN exemptions	0	0	0.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.25	1
National treatment for mode 4 delivery	0	1	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	1	1	1	1	1
Market access (i.e. prohibition on QRs as in	0	0	0.5	1	0.5	0	0.5	0	1	1	1	1
Domestic regulation	0	0	0	0.75	0	0	0.75	0	0	0.75	0.75	0.75
Transparency of regulations governing service delivery via mode 4	0.7	0.4	0	0.7	0	0	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.3	1	0.4
Transparency of regulations governing temporary movement of persons	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.7	0.4	0.7	0	0	0
Recognition	0.75	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.5	0	0.5	0.2	0	0.75	0.75	0.5
Denial of benefits (i.e. rules of origin)	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.75	1	1	1	1	1
Ratchet mechanism	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
<b>CONTENT OF AGREEMENT</b>												
<b>(a) SERVICE DELIVERY</b>												
General reservations/exceptions	1	1	1	0.5	1	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1
Sectoral exclusions						See Table A-5						
Regional exclusions	0.4	1	1	0.7	1	0	1	0.7	1	1	0.4	1
Restrictions on land purchases	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Considerations on Minority	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
Symmetry of provisions	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>(a) FACILITATION OF MOBILITY</b>												
Skill coverage	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.25	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5
Short term entry	1	0.75	1	0.75	0.75	0	0.75	1	1	1	0	1
Long term entry	1	1	1	0.8	0	0	0.6	1	0.2	1	0	1
Quotas on numbers of entrants	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Needs test	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local labour market testing or other criteria	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Simple average</b>	0.534	0.606	0.510	0.618	0.440	0.040	0.520	0.538	0.584	0.632	0.496	0.656
<b>Total score</b>	8.338	11.231	9.514	9.251	9.036	0.000	8.886	9.492	9.131	9.904	7.320	11.072

**Table A-5: Sectoral exclusions – Cross-Boarder trade**

(% of sub-sectors excluded: Total sub-sectors=138)

		Business services		Communication services		Construction services		Distribution services		Educational services		Environmental services	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
<b>AFTA</b>		<b>90.0</b>	<b>80.4</b>	<b>89.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>96.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>92.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>
	Brunei	83.3	88.1	71.4	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Cambodia	85.7	52.4	100.0	61.9	0.0	100.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	0.0
	Indonesia	100.0	100.0	100.0	85.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Laos	92.9	-	61.9	-	50.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
	Malaysia	88.1	42.9	61.9	42.9	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Myanmar	92.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Philippines	85.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Singapore	78.6	61.9	95.2	85.7	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Thailand	95.2	97.6	100.0	90.5	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Vietnam	97.6	-	100.0	-	0.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
<b>AFTA-China</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>71.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>96.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>43.8</b>
	AFTA	100.0	80.4	100.0	83.3	100.0	75.0	100.0	96.9	100.0	92.5	100.0	87.5
	China	100.0	61.9	100.0	81.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
<b>Australia-US</b>		<b>7.1</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Australia	9.5	28.6	23.8	38.1	0.0	0.0	50.0	25.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	USA	4.8	33.3	23.8	9.5	0.0	0.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>CER</b>		<b>0.0</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Australia	0.0	28.6	0.0	38.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	New Zealand	0.0	54.8	9.5	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Chile-Korea</b>		<b>29.8</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Chile	28.6	100.0	71.4	71.4	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
	Korea	31.0	64.3	81.0	57.1	100.0	50.0	0.0	75.0	20.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>EFTA</b>		<b>22.6</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>25.0</b>
	Iceland	0.0	23.8	90.5	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Liechtenstein	42.9	42.9	66.7	71.4	0.0	100.0	75.0	0.0	40.0	40.0	33.3	0.0
	Norway	23.8	16.7	28.6	61.9	0.0	0.0	75.0	25.0	80.0	20.0	100.0	100.0
	Switzerland	23.8	23.8	33.3	33.3	0.0	50.0	25.0	0.0	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
<b>EU-Mexico</b>		<b>39.6</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
	EU (Avg.)	19.6	19.6	76.2	76.2	0.0	0.0	6.3	6.3	27.5	27.5	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	59.5	59.5	66.7	66.7	100.0	100.0	50.0	50.0	20.0	20.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Japan-Mexico</b>		<b>31.0</b>	<b>53.6</b>	<b>73.8</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Japan	26.2	47.6	76.2	23.8	50.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	35.7	59.5	71.4	66.7	25.0	100.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Japan-Singapore</b>		<b>33.3</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Japan	38.1	47.6	14.3	23.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Singapore	28.6	61.9	47.6	85.7	0.0	0.0	75.0	100.0	20.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Korea-Singapore</b>		<b>46.4</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Korea	59.5	64.3	81.0	57.1	100.0	50.0	50.0	75.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Singapore	33.3	61.9	76.2	85.7	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	33.3	100.0
<b>NAFTA</b>		<b>19.0</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>
	Canada	14.3	52.4	61.9	61.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	28.6	59.5	71.4	66.7	0.0	100.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	100.0
	USA	14.3	33.3	71.4	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Singapore-US</b>		<b>63.1</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>92.9</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Singapore	26.2	61.9	95.2	85.7	0.0	0.0	50.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	USA	100.0	33.3	90.5	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0

**Table A-5 (Cont): Sectoral exclusions – Cross-Boarder trade**

		Financial services		Health related and social services		Tourism and travel services		Recreational, cultural and sporting services		Transport services		Total	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
<b>AFTA</b>		<b>99.4</b>	<b>93.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>54.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>78.1</b>	<b>92.1</b>	<b>84.8</b>	<b>90.1</b>	<b>83.9</b>
	Brunei	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	81.8	100.0	83.3	96.4
	Cambodia	100.0	93.8	100.0	66.7	66.7	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	81.8	92.0	63.8
	Indonesia	100.0	56.3	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.6	91.3
	Laos	93.8	-	100.0	-	66.7	-	100.0	-	90.9	-	87.0	-
	Malaysia	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	33.3	33.3	100.0	50.0	93.9	90.9	84.8	65.2
	Myanmar	100.0	93.8	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3	100.0	100.0	93.9	57.6	94.9	87.7
	Philippines	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	92.0	91.3
	Singapore	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	100.0	75.0	90.9	90.9	86.2	79.7
	Thailand	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	81.8	90.9	90.6	95.7
	Vietnam	100.0	-	100.0	-	33.3	-	100.0	-	87.9	-	92.0	-
<b>AFTA-China</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>87.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>89.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>84.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>78.2</b>
	AFTA	100.0	93.0	100.0	91.7	100.0	54.2	100.0	78.1	100.0	84.8	100.0	83.9
	China	100.0	81.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	84.8	100.0	72.5
<b>Australia-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>51.4</b>
	Australia	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	50.0	6.1	78.8	22.5	51.4
	USA	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	84.8	24.6	51.4
<b>CER</b>		<b>3.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>55.1</b>
	Australia	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	50.0	27.3	78.8	6.5	51.4
	New Zealand	6.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	27.3	66.7	9.4	58.7
<b>Chile-Korea</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>96.9</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>97.0</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>84.8</b>
	Chile	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	42.4	100.0	42.0	93.5
	Korea	100.0	93.8	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	51.5	93.9	50.7	76.1
<b>EFTA</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>43.7</b>	<b>50.9</b>
	Iceland	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	66.7	69.7	41.3	52.2
	Liechtenstein	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3	100.0	50.0	50.0	9.1	81.8	45.7	63.8
	Norway	100.0	25.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	75.0	54.5	81.8	47.8	44.9
	Switzerland	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	33.3	50.0	50.0	42.4	45.5	39.9	42.8
<b>EU-Mexico</b>		<b>68.8</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>52.1</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>78.8</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>53.3</b>
	EU (Average)	37.5	37.5	100.0	100.0	37.5	37.5	25.0	25.0	81.8	81.8	46.4	46.4
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	66.7	66.7	66.7	66.7	100.0	100.0	97.0	97.0	76.1	76.1
<b>Japan-Mexico</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>62.0</b>
	Japan	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.6	69.7	48.6	47.8
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	66.7	50.0	100.0	90.9	97.0	58.0	76.1
<b>Japan-Singapore</b>		<b>93.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>63.8</b>
	Japan	100.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	69.7	69.7	44.2	47.8
	Singapore	87.5	100.0	33.3	100.0	33.3	66.7	50.0	75.0	63.6	90.9	49.3	79.7
<b>Korea-Singapore</b>		<b>90.6</b>	<b>96.9</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>92.4</b>	<b>59.8</b>	<b>77.9</b>
	Korea	93.8	93.8	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	100.0	60.6	93.9	70.3	76.1
	Singapore	87.5	100.0	66.7	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	75.0	45.5	90.9	49.3	79.7
<b>NAFTA</b>		<b>75.0</b>	<b>89.6</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>88.9</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>64.5</b>
	Canada	25.0	68.8	33.3	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	100.0	54.5	84.8	30.4	65.9
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	66.7	25.0	100.0	54.5	97.0	45.7	76.1
	USA	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	30.3	84.8	35.5	51.4
<b>Singapore-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>39.4</b>	<b>87.9</b>	<b>59.4</b>	<b>65.6</b>
	Singapore	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	75.0	24.2	90.9	49.3	79.7
	USA	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	54.5	84.8	69.6	51.4

**Table A-5 (Cont): Sectoral exclusions - Investment**

		Business services		Communication services		Construction services		Distribution services		Educational services		Environmental services	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
<b>AFTA</b>		<b>13.5</b>	<b>86.6</b>	<b>77.7</b>	<b>91.1</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>96.9</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>92.5</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>
	Brunei	97.6	97.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Cambodia	85.7	52.4	100.0	61.9	0.0	0.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	0.0
	Indonesia	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Laos	92.9	-	52.4	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
	Malaysia	92.9	76.2	100.0	95.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Myanmar	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Philippines	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Singapore	83.3	66.7	95.2	85.7	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Thailand	78.6	100.0	100.0	90.5	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Vietnam	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
<b>AFTA-China</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>90.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>93.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>98.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>96.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>93.8</b>
	AFTA	100.0	86.6	100.0	91.1	100.0	75.0	100.0	96.9	100.0	92.5	100.0	87.5
	China	100.0	95.2	100.0	95.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Australia-US</b>		<b>3.6</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>59.5</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Australia	4.8	26.2	90.5	71.4	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	USA	2.4	38.1	23.8	47.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>CER</b>		<b>0.0</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>85.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	Australia	0.0	26.2	0.0	71.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	New Zealand	0.0	57.1	9.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Chile-Korea</b>		<b>4.8</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Chile	2.4	92.9	71.4	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
	Korea	7.1	40.5	81.0	57.1	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>EFTA</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>34.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>59.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>
	Iceland	10.7	26.2	92.9	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	100.0	50.0	66.7
	Liechtenstein	93.1	50.0	94.8	71.4	70.0	100.0	100.0	50.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3
	Norway	0.0	33.3	90.5	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	33.3
	Switzerland	21.4	28.6	95.2	33.3	0.0	75.0	50.0	75.0	100.0	20.0	100.0	0.0
<b>EU-Mexico</b>		<b>25.6</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>59.4</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>
	EU (Average)	0.0	13.5	90.5	77.7	0.0	18.8	0.0	14.1	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	31.0	100.0	28.6	100.0	0.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	80.0	100.0	33.3	100.0
<b>Japan-Singapore</b>		<b>7.1</b>	<b>67.9</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>
	Japan	4.8	35.7	9.5	52.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	33.3
	Singapore	9.5	100.0	66.7	100.0	25.0	100.0	25.0	100.0	80.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Japan-Mexico</b>		<b>28.6</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>69.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>
	Japan	31.0	35.7	42.9	52.4	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	80.0	100.0	0.0	33.3
	Mexico	26.2	66.7	47.6	85.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Korea-Singapore</b>		<b>28.6</b>	<b>53.6</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Korea	28.6	40.5	76.2	57.1	100.0	100.0	50.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Singapore	28.6	66.7	76.2	85.7	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	60.0	100.0	33.3	100.0
<b>NAFTA</b>		<b>7.1</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>
	Canada	7.1	35.7	61.9	66.7	0.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	4.8	100.0	71.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	25.0	100.0	60.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
	USA	9.5	38.1	71.4	47.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Singapore-US</b>		<b>28.6</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>
	Singapore	56.8	66.7	88.8	85.7	59.4	0.0	57.0	100.0	62.5	100.0	50.0	100.0
	USA	42.9	38.1	66.7	47.6	0.0	0.0	75.0	25.0	80.0	100.0	33.3	100.0



**Table A-5 (Cont): Sectoral Exclusions – Investment**

		Financial services		Health related and social services		Tourism and travel services		Recreational, cultural and sporting services		Transport services		Total	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
<b>AFTA</b>		<b>87.5</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>79.0</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>89.6</b>
	Brunei	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.3	99.3
	Cambodia	100.0	81.3	100.0	66.7	100.0	66.7	100.0	0.0	100.0	81.8	92.8	60.9
	Indonesia	100.0	68.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.4
	Laos	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	93.9	-	89.1	-
	Malaysia	100.0	93.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.8	91.3
	Myanmar	100.0	93.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.3
	Philippines	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.9	66.7	98.6	91.3
	Singapore	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	66.7	100.0	75.0	100.0	90.9	90.6	81.2
	Thailand	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.0	93.9	89.1	97.1
	Vietnam	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
<b>AFTA-China</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>96.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>97.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>93.7</b>
	AFTA	100.0	92.2	100.0	95.8	100.0	91.7	100.0	84.4	100.0	91.7	100.0	89.6
	China	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.8
<b>Australia-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>21.2</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>58.0</b>
	Australia	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	50.0	15.2	72.7	34.8	52.2
	USA	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	25.0	27.3	93.9	23.2	63.8
<b>CER</b>		<b>3.1</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>56.5</b>
	Australia	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	27.3	72.7	6.5	52.2
	New Zealand	6.3	12.5	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	27.3	72.7	9.4	60.9
<b>Chile-Korea</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>30.3</b>	<b>98.5</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>84.4</b>
	Chile	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	27.3	97.0	29.7	94.9
	Korea	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	33.3	25.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	41.3	73.9
<b>EFTA</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>71.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>59.4</b>
	Iceland	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	100.0	37.9	78.8	42.4	60.1
	Liechtenstein	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	93.3	100.0	100.0	50.0	98.5	81.8	95.7	70.3
	Norway	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	54.5	78.8	39.1	60.9
	Switzerland	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	50.0	21.2	45.5	45.7	46.4
<b>EU-Mexico</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>93.8</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>39.6</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>64.8</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>88.0</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>62.3</b>
	EU (Average)	100.0	87.5	0.0	22.9	0.0	12.5	0.0	29.7	66.7	79.0	41.3	48.5
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	54.5	100.0	48.6	100.0
<b>Japan-Singapore</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>86.4</b>	<b>42.8</b>	<b>77.2</b>
	Japan	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	63.6	72.7	30.4	54.3
	Singapore	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	75.0	100.0	97.0	100.0	55.1	100.0
<b>Japan-Mexico</b>		<b>90.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>78.8</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>53.6</b>	<b>67.8</b>
	Japan	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	78.8	72.7	55.1	54.3
	Mexico	81.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	50.0	75.0	78.8	90.9	52.2	81.2
<b>Korea-Singapore</b>		<b>93.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>95.5</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>77.5</b>
	Korea	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	33.3	50.0	100.0	60.6	100.0	60.1	73.9
	Singapore	87.5	100.0	66.7	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	75.0	51.5	90.9	50.0	81.2
<b>NAFTA</b>		<b>75.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>88.9</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>91.9</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>76.3</b>
	Canada	25.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	21.2	81.8	20.3	65.2
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	50.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.8	100.0
	USA	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	66.7	50.0	25.0	33.3	93.9	35.5	63.8
<b>Singapore-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>92.4</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>72.5</b>
	Singapore	93.8	100.0	61.5	100.0	56.3	66.7	64.8	75.0	89.5	90.9	74.2	81.2
	USA	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	50.0	25.0	9.1	93.9	47.1	63.8

**Table A-5 (Cont): Sectoral Exclusions – Movement of People**

		Business services		Communication services		Construction services		Distribution services		Educational services		Environmental services	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
AFTA		10.7	82.1	76.2	70.2	6.3	75.0	9.4	90.6	31.3	92.5	0.0	75.0
	Brunei	90.5	85.7	57.1	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Cambodia	76.2	45.2	76.2	28.6	0.0	0.0	100.0	25.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	0.0
	Indonesia	100.0	100.0	100.0	85.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Laos	95.2	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
	Malaysia	85.7	42.9	100.0	28.6	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Myanmar	95.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Philippines	97.6	100.0	100.0	81.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Singapore	90.5	100.0	95.2	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Thailand	81.0	83.3	85.7	71.4	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
	Vietnam	95.2	-	33.3	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-
AFTA-China		100.0	70.8	100.0	49.4	100.0	37.5	100.0	45.3	100.0	96.3	100.0	37.5
	AFTA	100.0	82.1	100.0	70.2	100.0	75.0	100.0	90.6	100.0	92.5	100.0	75.0
	China	100.0	59.5	100.0	28.6	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
Australia-US		7.1	32.1	23.8	26.2	0.0	50.0	37.5	12.5	10.0	50.0	0.0	50.0
	Australia	9.5	23.8	23.8	38.1	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	USA	4.8	40.5	23.8	14.3	0.0	100.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	100.0
CER		0.0	39.3	4.8	35.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0	40.0	0.0	50.0
	Australia	0.0	23.8	0.0	38.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	0.0
	New Zealand	0.0	54.8	9.5	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	100.0
Chile-Korea		29.8	59.5	76.2	45.2	50.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	10.0	100.0	0.0	66.7
	Chile	28.6	85.7	71.4	66.7	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
	Korea	31.0	33.3	81.0	23.8	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	100.0	0.0	33.3
EFTA		47.6	33.3	61.9	58.3	25.0	68.8	50.0	25.0	20.0	75.0	100.0	25.0
	Iceland	51.2	21.4	92.9	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	100.0	50.0	0.0
	Liechtenstein	90.7	50.0	84.8	71.4	60.0	100.0	100.0	25.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	66.7
	Norway	76.2	26.2	90.5	61.9	0.0	100.0	0.0	75.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Switzerland	26.2	35.7	95.2	33.3	0.0	75.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	60.0	100.0	33.3
EU-Mexico		22.6	55.4	54.8	88.1	0.0	53.1	43.8	54.7	40.0	65.6	33.3	50.0
	EU (Average)	0.0	10.7	90.5	76.2	0.0	6.3	0.0	9.4	0.0	31.3	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	23.8	47.6	28.6	61.9	0.0	25.0	75.0	50.0	80.0	20.0	100.0	100.0
Japan-Singapore		31.0	40.5	73.8	42.9	37.5	12.5	12.5	25.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	50.0
	Japan	26.2	33.3	76.2	23.8	50.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Singapore	35.7	47.6	71.4	61.9	25.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	100.0
Japan-Mexico		52.4	66.7	57.1	61.9	50.0	50.0	100.0	50.0	70.0	100.0	50.0	50.0
	Japan	4.8	33.3	14.3	23.8	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	40.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Korea-Singapore		46.4	66.7	78.6	61.9	50.0	50.0	75.0	50.0	70.0	100.0	66.7	66.7
	Korea	59.5	33.3	81.0	23.8	100.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3
	Singapore	33.3	100.0	76.2	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	40.0	100.0	33.3	100.0
NAFTA		19.0	46.0	68.3	34.9	0.0	41.7	0.0	25.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	66.7
	Canada	14.3	50.0	61.9	28.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Mexico	28.6	47.6	71.4	61.9	0.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	100.0
	USA	14.3	40.5	71.4	14.3	0.0	100.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	100.0
Singapore-US		23.8	70.2	33.3	57.1	0.0	100.0	25.0	62.5	40.0	80.0	0.0	100.0
	Singapore	29.2	100.0	69.0	100.0	15.6	100.0	29.7	100.0	25.6	100.0	50.0	100.0
	USA	42.9	40.5	66.7	14.3	0.0	100.0	75.0	25.0	40.0	60.0	33.3	100.0

**Table A-5 (Cont): Sectoral Exclusions – Movement of People**

		Financial services		Health related and social services		Tourism and travel services		Recreational, cultural and sporting services		Transport services		Total	
			GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS		GATS
<b>AFTA</b>		<b>20.3</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>70.8</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>73.1</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>80.1</b>
	Brunei	75.0	75.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	81.8	100.0	83.3	87.7
	Cambodia	100.0	0.0	100.0	66.7	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	90.9	75.8	84.1	40.6
	Indonesia	100.0	68.8	100.0	100.0	33.3	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.6	93.5
	Laos	93.8	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	100.0	-	90.9	-	95.7	-
	Malaysia	87.5	93.8	100.0	66.7	100.0	33.3	100.0	75.0	100.0	90.9	91.3	63.0
	Myanmar	100.0	93.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.6	99.3
	Philippines	100.0	75.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.9	66.7	97.8	86.2
	Singapore	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	92.8	88.4
	Thailand	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	33.3	100.0	75.0	93.9	81.8	87.0	81.9
	Vietnam	100.0	-	100.0	-	33.3	-	100.0	-	84.8	-	83.3	-
<b>AFTA-China</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>41.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>95.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>90.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>84.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>66.8</b>
	AFTA	100.0	63.3	100.0	91.7	100.0	70.8	100.0	81.3	100.0	89.4	100.0	80.1
	China	100.0	18.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	78.8	100.0	53.6
<b>Australia-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>74.2</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>44.6</b>
	Australia	100.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	6.1	72.7	22.5	47.1
	USA	100.0	0.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	75.8	24.6	42.0
<b>CER</b>		<b>3.1</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>47.8</b>
	Australia	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	27.3	72.7	6.5	47.1
	New Zealand	6.3	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	27.3	72.7	9.4	48.6
<b>Chile-Korea</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>93.9</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>67.8</b>
	Chile	100.0	75.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	42.4	97.0	42.0	84.8
	Korea	100.0	50.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	51.5	90.9	50.7	50.7
<b>EFTA</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>93.9</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>46.0</b>
	Iceland	37.5	0.0	66.7	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	25.0	39.4	75.8	48.6	42.8
	Liechtenstein	95.6	0.0	100.0	0.0	80.0	100.0	100.0	50.0	93.6	81.8	91.2	55.8
	Norway	31.3	0.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	54.5	69.7	54.3	47.1
	Switzerland	43.8	25.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	0.0	50.0	24.2	39.4	42.8	38.4
<b>EU-Mexico</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>86.6</b>	<b>43.7</b>	<b>68.8</b>
	EU (Average)	100.0	20.3	0.0	10.4	0.0	10.4	0.0	31.3	66.7	73.1	41.3	37.6
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	100.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	75.0	100.0	54.5	93.9	47.8	66.7
<b>Japan-Singapore</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>52.5</b>
	Japan	100.0	25.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.6	66.7	48.6	38.4
	Singapore	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	50.0	100.0	90.9	93.9	58.0	66.7
<b>Japan-Mexico</b>		<b>50.0</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>84.8</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>63.4</b>
	Japan	0.0	25.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	69.7	66.7	25.4	38.4
	Mexico	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	88.4
<b>Korea-Singapore</b>		<b>0.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>95.5</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>69.6</b>
	Korea	0.0	50.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	75.0	100.0	60.6	90.9	59.4	50.7
	Singapore	0.0	0.0	66.7	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	45.5	100.0	39.1	88.4
<b>NAFTA</b>		<b>75.0</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>66.7</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>56.3</b>
	Canada	25.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	54.5	75.8	30.4	60.1
	Mexico	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3	0.0	0.0	25.0	100.0	54.5	93.9	45.7	66.7
	USA	100.0	0.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	30.3	75.8	35.5	42.0
<b>Singapore-US</b>		<b>100.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>87.9</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>65.2</b>
	Singapore	60.2	0.0	21.9	100.0	5.2	100.0	65.6	100.0	83.5	100.0	52.2	88.4
	USA	100.0	0.0	100.0	66.7	33.3	0.0	50.0	0.0	9.1	75.8	45.7	42.0